It had been proved that every non-cooperative game had a Nash equilibrium point. Although many existing algorithms are capable of finding equilibrium points, it is still unclear what force is driving the players to them in the real world. We show that, the players' immediately and constantly pursuing profitable strategies is sufficient for the game to evolve towards equilibrium point, and meanwhile the game needs minimum information exchange among players and no mediation from beyond players. Accordingly, we suggest that in reality the tendency towards Nash equilibrium could be more pervasive and irresistible than expected. Technically, the players' pursuit of profitable strategies gives rise to a sequence of adjusted strategies for our study its approximation to the true equilibrium point. And the sequence can be nicely visualized as a clear path towards an equilibrium point. Our theory has the limitation in optimizing the accuracy of equilibrium point approximation.
It had been proved that every non-cooperative game had a Nash equilibrium point. Although many existing algorithms are capable of finding equilibrium points, it is still unclear what force is driving the players to them in the real world. We show that, the players' immediately and constantly pursuing profitable strategies is sufficient for the game to evolve towards equilibrium point, and meanwhile the game needs minimum information exchange among players and no mediation from beyond players. Accordingly, we suggest that in reality the tendency towards Nash equilibrium could be more pervasive and irresistible than expected. Technically, the players' pursuit of profitable strategies gives rise to a sequence of adjusted strategies for our study its approximation to the true equilibrium point. And the sequence can be nicely visualized as a clear path towards an equilibrium point. Our theory has the limitation in optimizing the accuracy of equilibrium point approximation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1951 John Nash proved that every non-cooperative game has an equilibrium point 1 by using Brouwer's fixed point theorem 2 . Nash's proof is existential for equilibrium point and yet non-constructive for finding one. Since then, a variety of algorithmic approaches had been proposed to find equilibrium point 3, 4 , among which the celebrated Lemke-Howson algorithm appears to be efficient for the two-person game 5, 6 . In general these algorithms take as input the whole information of players' payoff on strategies and pinpoint equilibrium points as output, implying that Nash equilibrium can only be achieved with strict coordination and intervention from the all-seeing mediators beyond players. In other words, equilibrium point is at best a destination without a clear path for players to follow. Such concern on the existing algorithms seriously undermines the credibility and hence merit of Nash equilibrium theory in the real-life applications.
In this paper we propose a theory that equilibrium point could be achieved without any beyond-player mediation. We will suggest a process of players simultaneously and continuously adjusting their strategies to approximate an equilibrium point. To make the decision of strategy adjustment, each player needs information no more than its opponents' current strategies in public -no need to pry into their payoff or look back on the history of game. We will show that this process results in "strategy paths" towards equilibrium point, as shown in FIG 1 and FIG 2 The remainder of paper goes as follows. In Section II, we vectorize the key concepts of non-cooperative game in preparation of Section III, in which we consider finding equilibrium point to be an approximation problem. In Section IV, the approximation algorithm is verified with the examples both of two-person game and general n-person game, and their "strategy paths" are visualized as shown in the figures mentioned previously. In Section V, we address the accuracy issues of a) Electronic mail: lsz@nzqrc.cn equilibrium point approximation. In Section VI, we consider some generalizations for our theory. Figure 1 : The pair of "strategy paths" on the simplex of R 3 for a two-person game. The game has the code name 3X3-1eq2sp to refer to, indicating that the game has one single equilibrium point and either player can use three pure strategies.
II. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
In this section, we try to define the condition of Nash equilibrium in the form of vector and its L1-norm. First of all, let us define the familiar concepts of non-cooperative game and set up their notations.
• There are n players, and each player i has g i pure strategies. The i th player's j th pure strategy is denoted by π i j .
• Each player i's mixed strategy s i is a point of a probability simplex I i , which is a compact and convex subset of the real vector space R g i of g i dimensions. That is,
arXiv:1908.09021v2 [cs.GT] 27 Aug 2019 Figure 2 : The pair of "strategy paths" for a two-person game where two player use 60 and 40 pure strategies respectively. The 60 or 40 dimensions of "strategy path" data are reduced with PCA to three dimensions for the visualization in R 3 .
Figure 3:
The equilibrium point of game 3X3-1eq2sp is an "attractor" for all "strategy paths".
• Each player i has a payoff function p i : S→R. Any S∈S is an n-tuple of mixed strategies, e.g. (s 1 , . . . , s i , . . . , s n ), in which each item s i is associated with the i th player such that s i ∈I i . Therefore, S is the product of all n players' simplices, i.e. I 1 ×I 2 ×· · ·×I n .
• Any player i can, from the existing S∈S, form a new ntuple of mixed strategies, denoted by s i ; S∈S, by unilaterally substituting the i th item of S with its new mixed strategy s i , or as a special case, π i j ; S∈S by unilater-ally substituting with its j th pure strategy. Obviously, s i ; S=S if s i is already in S i or in other words S already uses s i .
Intendedly, these vector-centric definitions and notations allow us to, for any player i=1, 2, . . ., n, translate the linearity of its payoff p i (S) in s i into p i (S)= s i , v i . Here ·, · is the inner product of vectors, s i is the mixed strategy player i uses in S and v i is the player's payoff vector for the g i vertices of its simplex I i . Given any n-tuple S∈S, for each player i we have v i,S = p i (π i1 ; S), . . . , p i (π i j ; S), . . . , p i (π ig i ; S) . (1) Given any S, each player can substitute its item in S with s i ∈I i to form a new one s i ; S∈S, which means that we can designate for each player i a variant payoff function p i,S of substitute strategy s i . That is
Note that p i,S (s i ) is the expected value of payoff or simply the average payoff, since s i can be conveniently treated as probability distribution. From Eq. (1) and (2) we can derive for each player i a function
Here each component of vector λ i,S (s i ) is defined by the very function proposed by Nash in his existential proof 1 :
Each component ϕ i j,S (s i ) represents the payoff gain for player i when its strategy moves from mixed s i to its j th pure strategy. We say a pure strategy is "more profitable" than s i if its ϕ i j,S (s i )>0 or otherwise "less (or equally) profitable". Vector λ i,S (s i ) has at least one zero component, since there must be one "least profitable" pure strategy as implied by the linearity of p i,S (s i ) in s i . Given S, vector λ i,S (s i ) measures, in terms of payoff, how far a substitute s i is from the optimal one. Specifically, the L1-norm of λ i,S (s i ), i.e. λ i,S (s i ) = ∑ g i j ϕ i j,S (s i ), decreases as p i,S (s i ) increases and would turn zero when p i,S (s i ) is maximized with the optimal substitute. Recall that an equilibrium point is an n-tuple S in which each player's mixed strategy is optimal against those of its opponents 1 . That is, an n-tuple S + ∈S is an equilibrium point, if and only if λ i,S + (s + i )=0 or equivalently λ i,S + (s + i ) =0 for each item s + i in S + . Vector λ i,S (s i ) will be the focal point of our study. We call λ i,S (s i ) the vertex gain vector (VGV) of player i in that it indicates how much payoff it would gain if its strategy moved to the vertices of its simplex I i , and correspondingly λ i,S (s i ) the vertex gain sum (VGS) of player i. We shall occasionally abbreviate equilibrium point by EqPt, and write p i (s i ), ϕ i j (s i ) and λ i (s i ) as implicitly indexed by given S.
III. FIXED POINT ITERATION
In this section, we try to turn the searching for Nash equilibrium into an approximation problem, specifically, by utilizing the method of fixed point iteration 7 .
By using Eq. (3) we try to define an iterated function Ψ•Ψ•· · ·•Ψ(S), denoted by Ψ k (S) with k∈N, in order to transform any given S 0 ∈S to S k ∈S as an approximate point S * of the true EqPt S + ∈S, such that S * =Ψ k (S 0 )≈S + . Here is the design of this crucial function Ψ of given S:
For i=1, 2, . . ., n,
Here r i >0. We write ψ i (s i ) occasionally. Note that Ψ(S)∈S for any S∈S because ψ i (s i )∈I i for any s i ∈I i . In particular, Ψ(S + )=S + if and only if S + is an EqPt. Given S=S 0 , those iterated functions Ψ k (S) with k=1, 2, 3, . . . give rise to an infinite sequence of points of S for our study:
Here Ψ 0 denotes the identity function. We denote this sequence by (S k ) N which is implicitly indexed by S 0 and Ψ. In fact, the tuple [Ψ, S 0 ] uniquely determines a sequence (S k ) N . We say that [Ψ, S 0 ] generates (S k ) N . Now we can visualize (S k ) N as an infinite iterations of players adjusting their strategies in parallel. Specifically, at the k th iteration, each player i adjusts its strategy by substituting s i in S k−1 with ψ i (s i ), i.e. from s i ; S k−1 to ψ i (s i ); S k−1 , so as to collectively form a new n-tuple S k ; at the (k+1) th iteration S k+1 is formed by adjusting S k in the same manner; and so forth.
By comparing s i and s i =ψ i (s i ), it is important to note that there must be less proportion of pure strategy π i j used in s i than in s i , if its corresponding component ϕ i j (s i ) in vector λ i (s i ) is zero. In other words, a player's unilateral strategy adjustment preferably suppresses the use of "less profitable than average" pure strategies and meantime enhances the use of some of the "more profitable than average" ones. Besides, we have the following theorems regarding s i and s i :
Proof. By Eq. (2) we know p i (s i )= ψ i (s i ), v i where v i is the player i's vertex payoff vector as in Eq. (1). Then by Eq. (6) we have,
Here also by Eq.
Finally because λ i (s i ) 2 ≥0 and r −1
And
Proof. For each component ϕ i j (s) in vector λ i (s) and its counterpart ϕ i j (s i ) in vector λ i (s i ), by Eq. (4) and Theorem 1 we
Theorem 1 states that, if a player unilaterally adjusts its strategy by Eq. (6) its payoff always increases unless its strategy is already optimal. And Theorem 2 states that such unilateral adjustment of strategy actually reduces the player's VGS so as to bring its strategy "closer" to the optimal one. Our approach to approximate an EqPt takes root in the following presumption:
If all players simultaneously adjust their strategies by Eq. (6), their payoff will increase and their VGS will decrease.
It immediately follows that, in the sequence (S k ) N we have
for any player i and any iteration k≥1. In this case, all n players' VGS would simultaneously and monotonically decrease along (S k ) N such that their strategies would be simultaneously getting "close" to their optimal ones. Collectively the sequence (S k ) N must tend towards an EqPt. Most importantly, the accuracy of such EqPt approximation can be measured by the sum of all n players' VGS, i.e. ∑ n i λ i (s i ) . It suffices to say that to improve approximation accuracy is to reduce VGS sum.
It would be ideal if VGS sum converged to zero along
for each player i. In that case, by definition lim ∞ S k , i.e. lim ∞ Ψ k (S 0 ), must be an EqPt. Denote it by S + and we must have Ψ(S + )=S + . Therefore, EqPt S + = lim ∞ S k is also a fixed point 8 of function Ψ; the sequence (S k ) N generated by [Ψ, S 0 ] is essentially an outcome of the process of fixed point iteration, which can be formulated to
Here comes the caveat. As it turns out in Section V, the presumption on the decreasing monotonicity of VGS along (S k ) N oftentimes doesn't hold true. Instead, due to simultaneous strategy adjustment players' VGS might fluctuate along (S k ) N with a tendency to diminish towards zero. Nevertheless, we will see this tendency can still serve the purpose of approximating an EqPt. 
The dotted line represents the simplex in R 2 . In this example vector λ i (s i ) must be to the direction of one vertex since the other one is "less profitable than average" such that in λ i (s i ) its ϕ i j (s i )=0.
It is important to note that function ψ i (s i ) of Eq. (6) has a geometric interpretation. Let s i =ψ i (s i ) and depict the relation of s i , λ i (s i ) and s i as in FIG 4. We can see that vector s i is "closer" to vector λ i (s i ) than vector s i is. Generally, the "closeness" of two vectors, say u and w, can be measured by their angle ∠(u, w), which further can be measured by
Simply, player i pushes its strategy towards its vertex gain vector (VGV) λ i (s i ) for an iteration of strategy adjustment. And as illustrated in FIG 4, the parameter r i in Eq. (6) determines the rate of angle by which vector s i and VGV "close up". Hence we call r i adjustment rate. As we will see in next section, "infinitesimal" adjustment rate is used for all players, in the hope that each player's strategy could be seen as unchanged by its opponents and thus their simultaneous strategy adjustment could be treated as approximately unilateral. Proof. By definition, we have cos∠(u+rw, w)= u+rw,w u+rw w and cos∠(u, w)= u,w u w to compare. There are three cases to consider with respect to u+rw, w , as follows: (i) If u+rw, w >0, by the triangle inequality we have
Because u + rw , w =− u, w >0, as with case (i) we have cos∠(u +rw , w )>cos∠(u , w ) and thus cos∠(u, −w)>cos∠(u+rw, −w), which easily gives cos∠(u, w)<cos∠(u+rw, w). Now we can visualize the sequence (S k ) N of Eq. (7) as players' perpetual searching for the equilibrium point of noncooperative game. In this searching, players don't have to be aware of the equilibrium point per se. Instead, each player is constantly chasing after its VGV λ i (s i ) in the hope of reducing its VGS λ i (s i ) to zero. Increasing payoff and meantime reducing VGS is the players' sole incentive and purpose, and VGV is the players' sole information and target for their strategies adjustment. VGV is dynamic along iterations, of course. At any iteration, given the current strategies of its opponents, each player can calculate its VGV by evaluating the payoff on its pure strategies without any retrospective or predictive considerations. Again, there is no place for the mediator with bird's-eye view; no inter-player information exchange other than the current use of strategies.
IV. GAME EXAMPLES AND VISUALIZATIONS
In this section we try to verify our approach of EqPt approximation proposed in last section. Examples of both twoperson game and general n-person game will be tested, although the former ones are our main consideration due to their simplicity and sufficiency in revealing the important aspects of EqPt approximation.
For the two-person game we have n=2 players, say the row player with l pure strategies and the column player with m pure strategies. Accordingly, the n-tuple S is specialized to two-tuple (s 1×l r , s 1×m c ) of vectors, and thus the tuple [Ψ, S 0 ] is specialized to [(A, B), (r r , r c ), (s r , s c ) 0 ] since function Ψ is determined by the two players' payoff bimatrix (A l×m , B l×m ) and their adjustment rates (r r , r c ). Recall that given any S 0 ∈S the tuple [Ψ, S 0 ] generates an infinite sequence (S k ) N correspondingly. Then we can implement the fixed point iteration in last section to Algorithm 1 1 , which takes [(A, B), (r r , r c ), (s r , s c ) 0 ] as input, and for our study outputs an approximate EqPt (s r , s c ) * in correspondence to S * , a finite sequence (s r , s c ) k K in correspondence to (S k ) N , and a finite VGS sequence (VGS r , VGS c ) k K . In Algorithm 1, the max operation compares vectors component-wise as opposed to Eq. (4), and 1 is identity matrix. Obviously, given K the computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is less than O(g 2 ) with g=max{l, m}.
Algorithm 1 EqPt approximation of two-person game. 
5:
VGS r = VGV r , VGS c = VGV c . 6: if VGS r +VGS c is a new minimum then 7: update approximate EqPt with (s r , s c ). 8: update (VGS r , VGS c ) * with (VGS r , VGS c ).
9:
endif 10: append (s r , s c ) into its sequence. 11: append (VGS r , VGS c ) into its sequence. Given the output of Algorithm 1, we can plot the true EqPt (s r , s c ) + , the approximate EqPt (s r , s c ) * and the sequence (s r , s c ) k K on R 2 or R 3 to provide an intuitive visualization of (s r , s c ) k N approximating EqPt. Specifically, for the 3×3 two-person games with m=3 and n=3, we split (s r , s c ) k K into two sequences of (s k ) K , and then transform each into a sequence of (x, y) k K for plotting on R 2 plane by defining
Note that Eq. (13) transforms the simplex in R 3 into a subset of R 2 enclosed by an equilateral triangle. The following are our observations on the test results of four typical 3×3 games:
• Game 3X3-1eq1sp has one unique EqPt, which uses one single pure strategy. As shown in FIG 5, (s r , s c ) k K converges straight towards the EqPt.
• Game 3X3-1eq2sp has one unique EqPt, which uses two pure strategies. As shown in FIG 1, ( s r , s c ) k K converge towards the EqPt with oscillation.
• Game 3X3-2eq2sp has two EqPts, each of which uses two pure strategies. As shown in FIG 6, ( s r , s c ) k K converges with oscillation towards one of the two EqPts dependent on initial strategies.
• Game 3X3-1eq3sp has one unique EqPt, which uses three pure strategies. As shown in FIG 7, (s r , s c ) k K doesn't converge towards the EqPt but develops into a perfect circle away from the true EqPt. The last position of (s r , s c ) k K could be any point in the circle. And for the general two-person games with m>3 and n>3, we split (s r , s c ) k K into two sequences of (s k ) K , and then with PCA (Principal Component Analysis for dimension reduction 9 ) transform each into a sequence of (x, y, z) k K for For the two-person game, its EqPts are determined by the bimatrix (A, B) , independent of (s r , s c ) 0 . Then for the 3×3 game examples mentioned previously, we test them with many random (s r , s c ) 0 and observe that there appear to be two kinds of EqPts, "attractor" EqPt and "repellor" EqPt, as follows: • For game 3X3- 1eq2sp FIG 3 shows that, any (s r , s c ) k K is "attracted" towards the unique EqPt.
• For game 3X3- 2eq2sp FIG 9 shows that, any (s r , s c ) k K is "attracted" towards one of the two EqPts.
• For game 3X3-1eq3sp FIG 10 shows that, any (s r , s c ) k K is "repelled" from the EqPt unless (s r , s c ) 0 is exactly the EqPt.
We also test the examples of n-person game by extending Algorithm 1 from bivariate case to general multivariate case, which can be better explained by the source code. And we observe the convergence or disconvergence of (S k ) K as with the two-person games. The computational complexity of this extended algorithm is less than O(n 2 g n ) with n being the number of players and g=max{g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n }, meaning that it is polynomial time when n is given.
V. EQPT APPROXIMATION ACCURACY
In last section, we observe that for some games sequence (s r , s c ) k K seemingly converges towards EqPt, e.g., 3X3-1eq1sp, 3X3-1eq2sp and 3X3-2eq2sp. Whereas for games such as 3X3-1eq3sp, sequence (s r , s c ) k K clearly doesn't converge at all; instead, it evolves into a perpetual cyclic path away from EqPt. Roughly speaking, the convergence or disconvergence of (s r , s c ) k K affects the accuracy of EqPt approximation. In this section, we will look into the approximation accuracy from two "quantitative" perspectives. One is to examine sequence (VGS r , VGS c ) k K since VGS is a measure of approximation accuracy as discussed in Section III, and the other one is to revisit the convergence of (s r , s c ) k K with metric. And we will show the connection between them. First, by taking the 3×3 games in last section for example, we have the following observations on their sequences (VGS r , VGS c ) k K plotted in FIG 11: • As opposed to the presumption in Section III, VGS oftentimes doesn't monotonically decrease. Instead, due to the inter-player influence in simultaneous strategy adjustment, VGS fluctuates with a decreasing tendency to reach new minimum. Game 3X3-1eq1sp barely has VGS fluctuation, whereas game 3X3-1eq3sp has intensive VGS fluctuation.
• There is different degree of periodicity in VGS fluctuation for different games. VGS fluctuation of game 3X3-1eq3sp exhibits strong periodicity and yet weak decreasing tendency.
• The strong periodicity of VGS sequence in game 3X3-1eq3sp, caused by the "repellor" EqPt, severely undermines the accuracy of EqPt approximation.
• It is painfully slow for VGS sequence to converge towards zero in that VGS decreases slowly at the latter iterations. That is partly because, according to Eq. (10), the ratio of incremental payoff to VGS is getting smaller as iteration goes.
Now it can be concluded that the inter-player influence has a significant impact on the EqPt approximation accuracy which otherwise could be optimized to be perfect given time.
In addition, FIG 12 shows the decreasing tendency of VGS for an five-person game.
Next, for the 3×3 games in last section, we will reexamine their sequences (s r , s c ) k K by introducing a metric on S. Generally, metric is necessary for the definitions of limit, convergence and contractiveness of sequence (S k ) N . Following the definitions in Section III, let us have a set S and a function Ψ : S→S of Eq. (5) . From S we can derive a complete metric space (S, d) with the metric function
Here x i and y i are the i th items of X∈S and Y∈S respectively. Assume that Ψ : S→S is a contraction mapping on metric space (S, d) . That is, there exists a q∈(0, 1) such that for any X, Y∈S
Then by Banach fixed point theorem 8 , the function Ψ must admit one unique fixed point S + ∈S such that Ψ(S + )=S + and lim ∞ Ψ k (S 0 )=S + for any S 0 ∈S. Apparently the contraction condition of Eq. (15) is too strong for the convergence of (S k ) N , since it precludes the sequence's possible convergence towards more than one EqPt, which is an important case of our interest as shown in last section. Instead, let us consider the contraction property of a specific sequence (S k ) N generated by the given tuple [Ψ, S 0 ]. From (S k ) N we can derive an infinite real sequence (ḋ k ) N + by defininġ
And from sequence (ḋ k ) N + we can further derive an infinite real sequence (q k ) N + by defininġ
If (S k ) N is a contractive sequence ideally, i.e. 0<q k <1 for any k∈N + , it must be an Cauchy sequence and converge to an EqPt. That is, (S k ) N is a process of fixed point iteration. Meanwhile, the sequence (ḋ k ) N + must monotonically decrease and converge to zero. From the (s r , s c ) k K sequences generated by the 3×3 games of last section, we derive and depict their (ḋ k ) K−1 and (q k ) K−2 in FIG 13 to show that their (ḋ k ) K−1 sequences doesn't monotonically decrease or converge to zero, meaning neither their (s r , s c ) k K sequences nor their Ψ functions are contractive on (S, d). Nevertheless, by comparing FIG 11 and FIG 13, we observe that there is strong coherence among the sequences (VGS r , VGS c ) k K , (ḋ k ) K−1 and (q k ) K−2 of the same game, as follows:
• As with VGS,ḋ oftentimes fluctuates with a decreasing tendency to reach new minimum.ḋ of game 3X3-1eq1sp exhibits almost no fluctuation, whereasḋ of game 3X3-1eq3sp exhibits strong periodicity.
• As with VGS, in game 3X3-1eq3sp the strong periodicity of (ḋ k ) K−1 can severely undermine the accuracy of EqPt approximation. •q fluctuates around 1 at the latter iterations, which explains why (ḋ k ) K−1 and VGS sequence converge at such a low speed.
Therefore,ḋ can be seen as an another overall measure of EqPt approximation accuracy in addition to VGS sum and to improve accuracy is to reduceḋ, which in return justifies our definition of metric function by Eq. (14). Trivially, there is an alternative metric function and applying it gives us observations similar to those with Eq. (14) . Here is the alternative 10 :
Now we can see the limitation of our theory: it relies too much on the naked-eye observation. Given S 0 and Ψ, only by observing the generated sequence (S k ) N and its derived sequences can we learn about their convergence or disconvergence, their periodicity, EqPts being "attractors" or "repellors", EqPt approximation accuracy, etc. And yet we fail to, in the case of two-person game, provide a function if any -say χ(A, B, r r , r c , S 0 ) for two-person game -to conveniently determine for [Ψ, S 0 ]. Nor can we provide a function χ(A, B, r r , r c ) to determine whether every S 0 ∈S leads to a convergent sequence.
As a practical use of our theory, given a game and players' initial strategy S 0 we need to find out the optimal parameters for function Ψ in order to optimize EqPt approximation accuracy. That is, in the case of two-person game, given payoff bimatrix (A, B) and initial (s r , s c ) 0 , we need to find out the optimal input [(A, B), (r r , r c ), (s r , s c ) 0 ] for Algorithm 1 to minimize VGS sum. For that purpose, obviously we can try different adjustment rates (r r , r c ) in input as in bined, there forms a search space for function Ψ, which could be overwhelming when it comes to many-person games.
VI. VARIANTS OF FUNCTION λ i,S
In this section, we introduce two variants of λ i,S function for the purpose of generalization.
By applying a general function α i : R ≥0 →R ≥0 component- Accordingly, we can write Eq. (9) to
Suppose that α i (0)=0, then the summation terms with p i (π i j ; S)−p i (s i )≤0 are eliminated from Eq. (20) such that
With Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) we can write Eq. (10) to
Note that α i (0)=0 ensures that "less profitable than average" pure strategies are less used as discussed in Section III. Now, the newλ i,S function not only increases payoff and thus decreases VGS for each player's unilateral strategy adjustment, but also exposes function α i to provide more control on the process of fixed point iteration. As Eq. (19) implies, function α i directly controls the target of player i's strategy adjustment by manipulating the components of VGV. In fact, Eq. (19) can be seen as a generalization of the decision-making on strategy target, whereas Eq. (3) is a special case with α i being identity function. In this sense, function α i could extend the scope for the interpretation of our theory in the real-life cases.
Next we introduce the second variant of λ i,S to propose another form of fixed point iteration beyond the non-cooperative game. In no relevance to the concepts of game, player, strategy and payoff, here we consider a system of n agents whose states, alike strategies, are defined to be points in simplex. Most distinctively, player i's λ i,S : I i →R g i ≥0 of Eq. (3) is replaced with general continuous λ i,S : I i →I i which maps agent i's current state into target state. For every agent i, because simplex I i is a compact and convex set, according to fixedpoint theorem 8 
This inequation shows that, each agent i's state will get closer, in terms of L2-norm distance, to its target state λ i (s i ) if it unilaterally updates its state by Eq. (23). Given proper function λ i and update rate r i , s i − λ i (s i ) could be decreasing, even monotonically, along the sequence (S k ) N of Eq. (7) . Now as with the treatment in Section III let us assume that, lim ∞ s i −λ i (s i ) (k) =0 or equivalently lim ∞ s i −λ i (s i ) (k) =0
for all agents, even if they simultaneously update their states by Eq. (23). In this case, (S k ) N is a process of fixed point iteration such that Ψ(S + )=S + with S + = lim ∞ S k . In our study on the firing equilibrium of neural network 11, 12 , we proposed a special case of this form of fixed point iteration where each agent's state s i ∈I i ⊂R 2 . We can compare this new fixed point iteration (FPI 2 to refer to) with the one in Section III (FPI 1 ). Both FPI 1 and FPI 2 seek out for an fixed point S + of function Ψ such that Ψ(S + )=S + . In FPI 1 such S + is an equilibrium point of noncooperative game because λ i,S + (s + i ) =0 for all players, while in FPI 2 such S + is a "stationary state" of system because λ i,S + (s + i )=s + i for all agents. In FPI 1 each player adjusts its strategy towards vector λ i (s i ) to diminish it, while in FPI 2 each agent updates its strategy towards λ i (s i ) to become it. We believe that, as with FPI 1 , the metric functions of Eq. (14) and Eq. (18) could be applied to FPI 2 for useful results.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we identify the "hidden force" that drives noncooperative game to Nash equilibrium. We show that player's strategy adjustment is solely driven by its immediate pursuit for "profitable" pure strategies. And meanwhile, the "unprofitable" pure strategies are immediately less used. As we can imagine, such pursuit must be taking place everywhere in the real world, making the tendency towards equilibrium point pervasive. In natural selection the players with more "profitable" pure strategies have more offspring than those with more "unprofitable" ones, which in return pervades the "profitable" pure strategies and suppresses the "unprofitable" ones. In markets the players usually use in their mixed "portfolios" the "pure strategies" they deem immediately profitable. And we can imagine that in many cases the tendency towards equilibrium point might be too strong to resist. So much so that its prevention could perhaps be more a suitable topic, since usually the equilibrium point is not optimal against the nonequilibrium ones in terms of payoff sum.
There are some other points worth mentioning. Our approximation of equilibrium point, which all boils down to players' reduction of VGS, actually makes no assumption on the existence of equilibrium point; the players need no notion of equilibrium point. The players adjust their strategies nearly independently with minimum information exchange among them, which means that the approximation of equilibrium point is effectively a distributed computation carried out by the nature. The periodicity we observe in those sequences of Section IV and Section V is an unexpected and yet truly interesting pattern worth further investigations.
